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Union recognition procedures are about to be reformed in the UK. Current legislative 
reform proposes automatic certification. Business prefers mandatory representation 
votes. Will the choice of union recognition procedure affect certification success? This 
paper provides empirical evidence on the impact of the choice of recognition procedure 
on certification success. Cross-section time-series analysis of nine Canadian 
jurisdictions over nineteen years is used to identify the effect of mandatory votes/ 
automatic certification on certification success. The results indicate that mandatory 
votes reduce certification success rates by 6 to 9 percentage points below what they 
would have been under automatic certification. This result is robust and significant at 
the 99 per cent level.  
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  1AUTOMATIC CERTIFICATION OR MANDATORY 
REPRESENTATION VOTES? HOW THE CHOICE OF UNION 





In the UK, on January 27, 1999, the Employment Relations Bill was 
introduced in Parliament. This Bill, among other things, proposes to reform 
union recognition procedures in Britain. It provides for ‘automatic 
certification’ - if a majority of employees in a bargaining unit are members 
of the union then the union is granted bargaining rights and no 
representation vote is necessary.
1 This legislation is contentious. Business 
has lobbied against automatic certification preferring instead the U.S. 
system of ‘mandatory representation votes’ - where a vote must be held 
before a union is recognized. Labour has opposed any ‘watering down’ of 
the current proposal.
2 Are mandatory representation votes and automatic 
certification really likely to have significantly different implications for 
British unions’ ability to maintain or expand their membership? In this 
paper I provide evidence on this issue from what is, to my knowledge, the 
only country in which these two legislative regimes co-exist - Canada. 
 
In particular, Canada is a federal state consisting of ten provinces. Labour 
law is primarily the responsibility of the provinces. Unions have been 
recognized in Canada on the basis of either automatic certification 
procedures or mandatory representation votes.
3 There is considerable 
variation over time and across jurisdictions in legislation specifying one of 
these two forms of union recognition. In this paper I conduct an 
econometric analysis of cross-section time-series data for nine Canadian 
provinces over the period from 1978 to 1996 to identify how the choice of 




  1This research presents convincing evidence that contributes substantially to 
an understanding of how different union recognition procedures affect 
certification success. Previous studies have used either time-series data or 
cross-section micro data. Because, within single jurisdictions, changes in 
legislation tend to occur in “bundles”, the studies based on time-series 
analysis are only able to identify the effect of very general changes in 
labour legislation. The one study based on cross-section micro data is not 
able to identify the effect of union recognition procedures because of 
insufficient variation in the data. This is the first study to apply cross-
section times-series analysis to this issue, and in doing so is able to 
successfully identify the effect of union recognition procedures on 
certification success. There are two reasons for this. First, cross-section 
time-series analysis incorporates much more variation than either of the 
other approaches. Second, cross-section time-series data allows variables to 
be included in the analysis that control for province and year effects as well 
province-specific time trends - it is not possible to control for all these 
factors using time-series or cross-section data alone.  
 
The empirical results show that the choice of recognition procedure does 
have a substantial impact on union certification success. Mandatory vote 
legislation reduces certification success rates by 6 to 9 percentage points 
below what they would be under automatic certification. This result is 
robust and significant at above the 99 percent level. 
 
2. Mandatory Representation Votes and the Canadian Industrial 
Relations Environment 
 
This section describes the difference between mandatory representation 
votes and automatic certification procedures in Canada. It also discusses 
two other features of the industrial relations legal environment in Canada 
that may affect certification success: compulsory dues checkoff and first 
agreement arbitration. Finally it provides an overview of the Canadian 
industrial relations legal environment and a description of the variation in 
  2legislation over time and across provinces. 
 
2.1. Mandatory representation votes and automatic certification 
procedures 
 
Mandatory representation votes and automatic certification are two 
alternative legal procedures for obtaining bargaining rights in Canada. Both 
procedures involve three stages
5. First, the union files an application for 
certification and provides evidence of union support. Second, a hearing is 
held before the Labour Relations Board involving all interested parties that 
determines the composition of the bargaining unit, considers any 
allegations of unfair labour practices and examines the membership 
evidence. Third, under a system of mandatory representation votes, if there 
is a minimum level of support for the union (based on the membership 
evidence filed in the first stage) then a secret ballot is conducted to 
determine if the union has enough support from the bargaining unit to be 
certified. Under a system of automatic certification it is not always 
necessary to hold a vote. If the membership evidence (filed in the first 
stage) indicates support for the union above a certain threshold the union is 
certified immediately without a vote. Only if the membership evidence is 
above some minimum level of support but below the threshold required for 
automatic certification will a representation vote be held. In either process 
the application for certification is dismissed if membership evidence is 
below the minimum level of support.
6  
 
2.2. Compulsory dues checkoff and first agreement arbitration 
 
In order to identify the effect of the different union recognition procedures 
on certification success it is important to control for any other elements of 
the legislative environment that may also affect certification success. Two 




  3Compulsory dues checkoff requires that, at the union’s request, a clause be 
included in a collective agreement that obligates the employer to deduct 
union dues directly from the wages of employees in the bargaining unit 
(whether or not they are members of the union) and remit these to the 
union.
8 The ability of an employer to block this type of union security 
clause (when it is not compulsory) can be a major obstacle to reaching a 
first agreement. Compulsory dues checkoff provides the incentive for 
unions to organize new units and maintain representation of existing units. 
Such clauses provide financial security and an increased ability to represent 
its members effectively. Unions are likely to increase their supply of 
services in this environment. Employees may be more likely to support the 
union if it is perceived that the union will be able to act more effectively on 
their behalf or if employees who were reluctant to support the union before 
because of the problem of free riders are more willing to do so now. 
However some employees may no longer support the union if they had 
hoped to be free riders. Employers may increase their resistance to 
unionization perceiving that this type of clause increases union power. 
Though its expected effect on certification success is ambiguous this type 
of legislation is generally considered to support the union movement. 
Martinello and Meng (1992) using 1986 cross-section micro data on 
Canadian workers in mining and manufacturing find that compulsory dues 
checkoff significantly increase the probability of certification success.  
 
First agreement arbitration allows the first collective agreement between a 
bargaining agent and an employer to be settled by binding arbitration if a 
negotiated agreement cannot be reached. The task of negotiating a first 
agreement is formidable. It involves writing clauses that describe all 
aspects of the employment relationship, not simply the revision of clauses 
in an existing agreement. Negotiation takes place in a context where 
patterns of communication have yet to be established and where the 
employer is likely to be hostile because it must relinquish some control for 
the first time. First agreement arbitration ensures that if a union succeeds in 
obtaining bargaining rights it will be able to effectively exercise those 
  4rights and obtain a first collective agreement. Under such circumstances 
unions are more willing to organize workers and workers are more likely to 
support these efforts. However employers may intensify their resistance to 
the union during the organizing period rather than waiting for the 
negotiation of the collective agreement. This type of legislation is 
considered to be supportive of the union movement however its impact on 
certification success is ambiguous. In a U.S. study, Cooke (1985), found 
that in a sample of newly organized unions in Indiana in 1979/80 one 
quarter of these unions failed to negotiate a first agreement by 1982. He 
finds that a union is more likely to negotiate a first agreement if a national 
union representative participates in the negotiations, if the bargaining unit 
is large and cohesive and if the firm already pays relatively high wages. He 
finds that lengthy delays and difficulties in NLRB
9 procedures for dealing 
with accusations of ‘bargaining in bad faith’ discourage achieving a first 
agreement. 
 
2.3. Canada’s industrial relations legal environment 
 
As mentioned the industrial relations legal environment in Canada is 
decentralized. The federal government has jurisdiction over its own public 
servants and also over a number of inter-provincial activities such as 
railways, trucking and shipping. The provincial governments have 
jurisdiction over all other activities within their geographical area. While 
there are many similarities in labour legislation across the various 
jurisdictions there are also significant differences. 
 
Mandatory representation votes, compulsory dues checkoff  and first 
agreement arbitration have been introduced in various Canadian 
jurisdictions at different points in time. Table 1 provides precise 
information on when each of these types of labour legislation is in force for 
each jurisdiction in Canada over the period from 1976 to 1996. Table 2 
gives the number of observations (province/year cells) corresponding to 
each of the eight possible legislative regimes (as defined by the presence of 
  5mandatory votes, compulsory dues checkoff and first agreement 
arbitration). It is clear from examining both Table 1 and Table 2 that there 
is substantial variation in legislation across jurisdictions and over time. 
Prior to the introduction of mandatory representation votes in Nova Scotia 
in 1977 all Canadian jurisdictions employed automatic certification for 
union recognition. Since this time mandatory votes have become more 
prevalent across Canada. British Columbia introduced them in 1984 and 
repealed this legislation in 1993. Alberta introduced mandatory vote 
legislation in 1988. Then in the mid-1990s Newfoundland (1994) and 
Ontario (1995) introduced mandatory votes. Even so, representation votes 
are required in less than half of Canadian jurisdictions. Both compulsory 
dues checkoff and first agreement arbitration have been more common in 
the sample. Table 2 shows that there are 42 province/year cells when 
mandatory vote legislation was in place, 79 province/year cells when first 
agreement arbitration was in place and 105 province/year cells when 
compulsory dues checkoff was in place. The variation in legislative regimes 
allows the impact of mandatory representation votes /automatic 
certification on certification success to be identified.  
 
3. Previous Research 
 
A number of studies suggest that mandatory representation votes reduce 
certification success. Weiler (1983) argues that mandatory representation 
votes discourage unionization in the U.S. whereas automatic certification 
procedures used in Canada support union organizing activity. He claims 
that the delay between a petition for certification and the election provides 
the employer with the opportunity to influence the outcome of the election 
and that unfair labour practices (ULPs) are frequently used to discourage 
union support because the penalties for doing so are neither timely nor 
large. Weiler supports his position with descriptive statistics drawn from 
the U.S. NLRB and Canadian LRB
10 Annual Reports. Cooke (1983) in a 
cross-section study based on NLRB certification records from 1979 finds 
that NLRB procedures, particularly the length of the delay between petition 
  6and election date, have a significant negative impact on certification 
success. Meltz (1985) and Gunderson and Meltz (1985), in comparative 
studies of the U.S. and Canada, argue that differences in the legislative 
environments affect union density and that automatic certification may be 
the single most important legal factor preventing the erosion of trade unions 
in Canada. Descriptive statistics are used to support this position. 
Martinello and Meng (1992) using 1986 cross-section micro data on 
Canadian workers in mining and manufacturing find that mandatory 
representation votes have no statistically significant effect on certification 
success. They suggest that this result may be due to insufficient variation of 
this variable in their data. 
 
Other studies address the impact of unfair labour practices on certification 
success - since it is argued that mandatory representation votes provide a 
greater opportunity for unfair labour practices (ULPs) it is instructive to 
examine this evidence. Getman et al (1976) look at a sample of 31 hotly 
contested unionization campaigns in the U.S. in 1972-73 and conclude that 
employer ULPs do not have a statistically significant impact on the vote. 
Dickens (1980) using the same data as Getman et al. (1976) and more 
sophisticated empirical analysis, finds that employer intimidation plays a 
very significant role in discouraging unionization. Two Canadian studies 
focus on the impact of ULPs on certification success. Thomason (1992) 
using micro data from Ontario for the period 1982-1990 (automatic 
certification prevailed over this time) finds that ULPs significantly reduce 
the probability of union certification in Ontario but that this reduction is 
very small when compared to the results of U.S. studies. He attributes this 
to evidence that the time delay between application and election is much 
shorter in Ontario (where such delays are measured in days) than in the 
U.S. (where such delays are measured in months). Riddell (1996) using 
micro data for British Columbia from 1987-88 (a mandatory representation 
vote was required at this time) finds that ULPs significantly reduce 
certification success. He also presents descriptive evidence that certification 
success in the period (1987-88, 1993-96) when B.C. did not require a 
  7representation vote was much higher (95-95% success rate) than in 1987-88 
when a representation vote was required (77% success rate).  
 
The possibility of employer intimidation is not the only reason that 
mandatory representation votes may influence unionization. In the context 
of a union organizing drive peer pressure from fellow workers to sign union 
membership cards may make it difficult for an employee to express their 
genuine feelings about the union. The secret ballot held under mandatory 
representation vote legislation allows the employee the freedom to express 
their true opinion of the union without fear of reprisal from either the 
union, other workers or the employer. 
 
Other studies examine the impact of general changes in labour legislation 
on certification success and unionization. Three Canadian studies look at 
the impact of changes in general labour legislation. Kumar and Dow (1986) 
use aggregate time series data for Canada from 1935 to 1981 to analyze the 
determinants of union growth. They include a dummy variable that 
measures the impact of PC1003- the legislation introduced in 1944 that 
gave Canadian labour collective bargaining rights. They find that this 
legislation has a significant effect on the growth of union membership. 
Martinello (1996) uses time-series data from 1951 to 1992 for British 
Columbia, Saskatchewan and Manitoba. In each province he identifies 
when major legislative reforms occurred. In his analysis of a single 
jurisdiction it is impossible to test for the impact of a specific reform 
because changes in labour legislation are typically ‘bundled’ together in 
one legislative package. Martinello controls for business conditions and the 
political environment. His results show that legislative change has a 
significant effect on certification success rates in all three provinces and 
this effect is larger than that of the other variables he defines. Martinello 
(1999) uses monthly data from 1987 to 1998 for Ontario to estimate the 
effects of changes in labour legislation and political party in power on 
certification activity. He finds that both these variables have significant 
effects on certification activity.  
  8 
Freeman and Pelletier (1990) examine the impact of industrial relations law 
on union density in the UK and Ireland. The authors create a law index on a 
five point scale with a value of one indicating years where the legislation 
was least favourable to unions and a value of five when it is most 
favourable. They use aggregate time series data from 1945 to 1986. They 
conclude that in the long run changes in legal regulations are a major 
determinant of UK density. They find that most of the decline in union 
density in the UK in the 1980s is due to the changed legal environment of 
industrial relations. The results for Ireland are not significant due to 
insufficient variation in the data.  
 
This paper is the first in this literature to use cross-section time-series 
analysis and as such is able to offer considerable insight into the effect of 
union recognition procedures on certification success. The empirical results 
are based on data for nine Canadian jurisdictions over a nineteen year 
period. The panel consists of observations where union recognition 
procedures differ across provinces and where union recognition procedures 
change over time within a province (as discussed earlier and shown in 
Tables 1 and 2). All of this information is incorporated into the econometric 
analysis. The analysis presented in this paper is able to identify the impact 
of mandatory representation votes on certification success. In contrast, 
earlier studies have used either pure time-series data or pure cross-section 
micro data and as a result are not able to identify the impact of specific 
union recognition procedures. Pure time-series studies (Kumar and Dow 
(1986), Freeman and Pelletier (1990), and Martinello (1996,1999)) are only 
able to identify the effect of very general changes in labour laws. In a single 
jurisdiction the variation in labour law over time is typically not sufficient 
to identify the effect of a specific law. Reforms to labour laws are usually 
introduced as a package and union recognition procedures have rarely been 
repealed. In this type of analysis there are no ‘control’ groups provided by 
other jurisdictions where the legislation does not change. Therefore the best 
that time-series analysis can do is to identify the impact of general changes 
  9in labour laws. Time-series analysis of a single jurisdiction also cannot 
control for provincial effects. There is one pure cross-section study based 
on micro data that covers a number of jurisdictions (Martinello and Meng 
(1992)). This study does not succeed in identifying the impact of mandatory 
representation votes. In this case, there is not enough variation in the use of 
different union recognition procedures across jurisdictions in the year they 
study (1986) to allow identification. Cross-section micro data also cannot 
control for specific year effects or for slowly changing provincial trends 
over time.
11 The use of cross-section time-series variation in my study 
allows the impact of specific labour laws to be identified. The cross-section 
time-series analysis is also able to include provincial fixed effects, year 
effects and province-specific time trends in the estimation and therefore we 
can be more confident that the results have correctly identified the impact 
of mandatory representation votes on certification success. Some of the 
previous research focuses on the impact of unfair labour practices on 
certification success. These studies only provide indirect evidence on the 
possible effect of mandatory representation votes on certification success. 
My study presents direct evidence on the effect of mandatory representation 
votes on certification success. 
 
4. Econometric Approach 
 
The decentralization of Canadian labour law permits the use of cross-
section time-series analysis to test for the effect of mandatory 
representation votes/automatic certification on certification success. The 
annual data cover nine Canadian jurisdictions over the period from 1978 to 
1996. Cross-section time-series analysis makes it easier to identify the 
impact of mandatory representation votes on certification success. This is 
more difficult in a single time-series because such legislation is often 
introduced as part of a package of reforms and once introduced it usually 
remains in force. 
 
 
  10Cross-section time-series analysis can be more efficient than OLS because 
it incorporates more information and takes into account the error 
relationships in the data set.
12 A number of possible error relationships may 
exist. There can be heteroscedasticity across provinces, correlation between 
provinces, common autocorrelation across provinces and/or province-
specific autocorrelation. Greene (1983, LIMDEP 7.0) suggests a number of 
diagnostic tests to detect the presence of these error relationships.
13 If these 
diagnostic tests reveal the presence of any of these error relationships 
FGLS is a more efficient estimation technique than OLS. 
 
4.1. The model 
 
The theoretical model that underlies the analysis is that of Ashenfelter and 
Pencavel (1969) where unionization is the result of the interaction of the 
demand for and supply of union services. The demand for union services is 
the result of cost-benefit analysis by workers. The supply of union services 
is the result of cost-benefit analysis by union organizers. Many factors can 
influence these actors’ perceptions of the costs and benefits including; 
employer tactics (themselves influenced by a similar cost-benefit analysis); 
legislation; overall economic conditions. Structural changes in the overall 
economy may not shift the individual supply or demand curves but can 
affect the aggregate outcome due to the changing composition of the 
economy. A reduced form of this model is estimated, in which I propose 
that: 
  t    , i + X t    , i   =   success t    , i   ion certificat  
 
Subscript i refers to the jurisdiction, subscript t refers to the time period. 
The model postulates that the certification success depends on a number of 
explanatory variables (X) that capture the legal, economic, organizational, 
and structural components of the environment and an error term ( ).  
 
  114.2. Dependent variables
14 
 
Two dependent variables are used as measures of certification success. The 
certification success rate (certrate) is defined as the percent of certifications 
disposed that are granted in the period. Certifications disposed refers to 
certification applications that are processed over the period.
15 Certification 
applications that are disposed are either granted, withdrawn or dismissed. 
Note that the data on the number of certifications granted and the number 
of certifications disposed refers to the number of bargaining units not to the 
number of employees that are in the bargaining unit. Endogeneity problems 
may be associated with the use of this variable. To illustrate, suppose 
legislation is passed that is favourable to the union movement. Within the 
Ashenfelter and Pencavel (1969) theoretical framework this alters all the 
actors’ cost-benefit calculus concerning organizing, joining or resisting a 
union. It is likely that attempts will be made to organize units that were 
previously considered too costly or difficult to organize. The number of 
certification applications made (and disposed) will increase. However the 
marginal applications are for units that likely have a lower propensity to 
certify and ceteris paribus their success rate is likely to be lower. In this 
case the coefficient on the legislation variable is biased toward zero and the 
results from specifications using certrate as a dependent variable would 
underestimate the effect of the explanatory variables on certification 
success.
16 While it is reasonable to suppose that endogeneity biases these 
results towards zero from a theoretical perspective it is possible for the bias 
to go in the other direction. 
 
In an attempt to reduce the endogeneity problem, specifications are also 
estimated using another definition of certification success. The certification 
success proportion (certprop) is defined as the percent of business 
establishments in a province that are granted certification within the period. 
Results based on specifications that use certprop as the dependent variable 
are not as open to the criticism concerning endogeneity because it is 
unlikely that the number of firms in a province is affected by the type of 
  12labour legislation examined in this paper. 
 
4.3. Explanatory variables 
 
The explanatory variables used in this study are similar to those used in 
other studies of union density and certification success. The variables 
attempt to capture the effects of legislation, business conditions, 
organizational environment and structural factors. In addition specifications 
are estimated that include fixed effects that attempt to take into account 
omitted variables.  
 
The legislation variables are the three discussed earlier; mandatory 
representation votes (mandvote); compulsory dues checkoff (checkoff); and 
first agreement arbitration (firstarb). Each of these variables is assigned the 
value one in periods and jurisdictions when such legislation is in effect and 
zero when it is not.
17 
 
Many studies include a variety of variables that capture business conditions 
when modeling certification success. In this study I use the following 
measures for economic conditions: the unemployment rate (linear (uerate) 
and quadratic (uerate2)) and its proportionate rate of change (duerate); the 
provincial inflation rate (pdot) and its rate of change (dpdot). While there is 
general agreement that cyclical conditions should be taken into account 
results of earlier studies do not present a consistent picture of how these 
cyclical variables affect certification success or union density. A priori it is 
not possible to sign the coefficients on the cyclical variables.  
 
The organizational environment is captured by provincial union density 
(density). It is hypothesized that as union density increases certification 
success increases because unions become an accepted part of the 
employment relationship and because unions have the financial resources to 
expand. However as union density increases fewer workers remain to be 
organized and it is likely that at some point the unorganized workers who 
  13remain are those that are the most difficult and costly to organize. At this 
point union density becomes negatively related to certification success. 
Specifications are estimated with density included linearly and /or 
quadratically (density2). 
 
Finally structural factors may affect certification success. Traditionally the 
easiest workers to organize are full-time males in the manufacturing sector. 
The more difficult workers to organize are part-time women in the service 
sector. Three variables are included to capture structural factors: the percent 
of those employed that are part-time (partime); the percent of those 
employed that are female (female); and an industry mix variable (mix). The 
industry mix variable for each province in a particular year is created by 
multiplying the employment share of each industry in that year by the 
national union density of that industry in 1976 and then summing over all 
the industries and multiplying by 100.
18 This indicates what union density 
would have been in province, i, in year, t, given the current employment 
mix in the province and assuming that 1976 national unionization rates 
prevail. A priori the coefficients on partime and female are expected to be 
negative while the coefficient on mix is expected to be positive. 
 
4.4. Fixed effects 
 
Provincial fixed effects, year fixed effects and province specific time trends 
are included in some specifications to capture omitted variables. The 
provincial dummies take into account provincial characteristics that are 
constant over time that are not in captured by the observable explanatory 
variables described above.
19 The year dummies incorporate aspects of 
national business conditions not captured by the unemployment rate and 
inflation rate measures. Province specific time trends capture any slowly-
changing trends in social attitudes towards unions at a provincial level 
attributing only ‘sudden’ changes in certification success to changes in 
legislation. Province-specific quadratic time trends are also used in some 
specifications. 
  145. Results 
 
Table 3 presents estimation results from two specifications where certrate 
is the dependent variable. Specification #1 includes legislation variables 
(mandvote, firstarb, checkoff), environment variables (mix, female, partime, 
density, uerate, pdot), and province dummies as explanatory variables. 
Specification #2 adds province-specific time trends. Columns 1 and 2 
present OLS estimates of these specifications.
20 Diagnostic tests on the 
error structures of both specifications show that heteroscedasticity exists 
across provinces; correlation exists among the provinces at a point in time; 
and there is province-specific first-order autocorrelation. FGLS corrects for 
these problems and provides more efficient estimates than OLS. The FGLS 
estimates for the two specifications are presented in columns 3 and 4 of 
Table 3. 
 
Results on the legislation variables are similar across specifications and 
estimation techniques. In all specifications the coefficient on mandvote is 
negative and significant at at least the 99% level. The evidence suggests 
that mandatory representation vote legislation reduces certification success 
rates by 6 to 9 percentage points from what they would have been under 
automatic certification. Since the mean value of certrate for the sample is 
69% this represents a large reduction of between 9 to 13 per cent in the 
certification success rate when mandatory vote legislation is in force. The 
coefficients on first agreement arbitration and compulsory dues checkoff 
are never significantly different from zero.  
 
Results on the environment variables are mixed. The coefficients on the 
cyclical variables are similar across all the estimates: the unemployment 
rate is always negative and significant; the inflation rate is never 
significantly different from zero. Higher unemployment rates thus reduce 
certification success rates. Coefficients that describe structural factors vary 
across the results. The industry mix coefficient is positive and significant in 
Specification #1. It may be that this coefficient is not significant in 
  15Specification #2 because the province-specific time trends introduced in 
this specification capture most of the variation in this variable. The sign on 
the industry mix coefficient confirms prior expectations. The coefficients 
on percent female, per cent part-time, and provincial union density are 
usually not significantly different from zero.  
 
The empirical results from the certrate regression indicate that mandatory 
vote legislation has a strong, negative impact on certification success rates. 
As noted earlier it is possible that these results are biased by the presence of 
endogeneity. In order to address this concern the same specifications are 
estimated again, this time using certprop as the dependent variable. These 
results are presented in Table 4. Columns 1 and 2 present the OLS results. 
Diagnostic tests indicate that FGLS can improve the efficiency of 
Specification #1 by correcting for heteroscedasticity across provinces; 
correlation between provinces; and province-specific first-order 
autocorrelation. These FGLS results are presented in column 3. Diagnostic 
tests indicate that FGLS can improve the efficiency of Specification #2 by 
correcting for heteroscedasticity across provinces and correlation between 
provinces. These FGLS results are presented column 4. 
 
When certprop rather than certrate is used as the dependent variable, 
mandvote continues to be negative and significant at the 99% level in all 
specifications. Firstarb is never significantly different from zero. Checkoff 
is negative and significant in the FGLS result for Specification #2. 
Coefficients on cyclical variables perform similarly in all specifications. 
The coefficient on the unemployment rate is always negative and 
significant. The coefficient on the inflation rate is always positive and 
significant. The structural variables present fairly consistent results. Female 
is always significant and negative as expected. Partime and density are 
never significantly different from zero. Mix is negative and significant in 
the FGLS estimation of Specification #1 otherwise it is not significantly 
different from zero. 
 
  16The results from the certification proportion regressions suggest that 
endogeneity is not causing the strong negative relationship between 
mandatory representation votes and certification success rates. The 
certprop regressions for all specifications find that a significant, negative 
relationship still exists between mandatory representation votes and this 




The results presented in this paper provide valuable information concerning 
the impact of two different types of union recognition procedures on 
certification success. The empirical results indicate that the choice of 
mandatory representation votes or automatic certification has a significant 
impact on certification success in Canada. Mandatory vote legislation 
reduces certification success rates by 6 to 9 percentage points from what 
they would be under automatic certification. This result is robust and 
significant at at least the 99% level.  
 
In contrast to earlier studies that only succeed in identifying the effects of 
very general changes in labour legislation the current paper is able to 
identify the effect of specific union recognition procedures on certification 
success. Identification is made possible by the use, for the first time in this 
literature, of cross-section time-series analysis. This approach is a 
considerable improvement over the time-series or cross-section analysis 
adopted in previous studies. First, cross-section time-series analysis 
incorporates much more variation than either of the other approaches. 
Second, cross-section time-series analysis allows variables to be included in 
the analysis that control for province and year effects as well province-
specific time trends - it is not possible to control for all these factors using 
time-series or cross-section data alone.  
 
The automatic recognition procedure outlined in the Employment Relations 
Bill in the United Kingdom differs in some respects from similar 
  17procedures in Canada. Nevertheless the essential feature of automatic 
certification - namely that it permits certification based on membership 
evidence gathered by the union and does not require a vote - remains the 
same in the proposed U. legislation as in Canada. The empirical results for 
Canada provide evidence that unions are more likely to succeed in 
obtaining recognition under automatic certification than under mandatory 
representation votes. The results also contribute to an understanding of the 
political dynamics involved when introducing union recognition 
procedures: labour is likely to support automatic certification while 
business is likely to support mandatory representation votes. This has 
certainly been the case in the political lobbying in the recent introduction of 
new union recognition procedures in the UK. 
  18Notes 
 
1.  The legislation applies only to firms with more than twenty 
employees. It also provides that if 10% of the bargaining unit are 
union members the union can force a representation vote. Under these 
circumstances the union is recognized if a majority of the employees 
that vote support the union and this represents at least 40% support of 
the bargaining unit.  
 
2.  The pressure placed on the government concerning this legislation 
was reported in the press. For some examples see: Webster, 
Philip,”Unions face tougher task to qualify for recognition”, The 
Times November 16, 1998, pp.1. and Webster, Philip,”Passions flare 
over Lords Reform,” The Times November 25, 1998. pp.1 Sherman, 
Jill “Unions cry foul,” The Times November 25, 1998, pp. 11. 
 
3.  An employer may also voluntarily recognize a union. Only a very 
small proportion of unions are voluntarily recognized. 
 
4.  All of the results presented in this paper exclude Prince Edward 
Island and the federal sector. PEI is a very small province with a 
population of approximately 100,000. Certification data are not 
readily available for this province. The federal sector is omitted 
because data are not available that properly measure the explanatory 
variables for this sector. 
 
5.  This description is a generalization of the certification process as it 
occurs across the many Canadian jurisdictions while details of exact 
procedures differ across the jurisdictions all certification procedures 
contain these common elements. 
 
6.  Membership evidence usually consists of signed membership cards. 
Support deemed sufficient for automatic certification varies across 
  20jurisdictions and has ranged from 50% of the bargaining unit to 65%. 
In some jurisdictions a union can be automatically certified without 
sufficient membership support if the Labour Relations Board believes 
that unfair labour practices by the employer prevent the true wishes of 
the employees in the bargaining unit from being expressed and that in 
fact a majority of employees do support the union. If a representation 
vote is held bargaining rights are granted if a majority of those voting 
(or of the bargaining unit, depending on the time period and 
jurisdiction) support the union. 
 
7.  It is also true that legislation that extends coverage to previously 
unorganized sectors of the economy affects certification success. 
Over the period from 1978 to 1996 there have been two changes in 
coverage in Canada. In 1988 British Columbia passed legislation 
granting teachers collective bargaining rights. In that year teachers’ 
associations were certified. Fortunately the data on certifications 
granted allowed the certifications associated with this change in 
coverage to be eliminated from the data. For more details please see 
the data appendix. From January 1, 1993 to November 10, 1995 
Ontario extended coverage to a group of previously unorganized 
workers (some groups of professionals and domestic workers 
employed in private homes). When this legislation was revoked all 
units that had been certified under the earlier legislation were 
decertified. I have not controlled for this change in the analysis. 
Results based on a sample for the period from 1978 to 1992 do not 
differ qualitatively from those over the longer period.  
 
8.  Usually employees in the bargaining unit who do not want to support 
the union for religious reasons may petition to have an amount of 
money equivalent to union dues deducted from their paycheque and 
then remitted to a charity rather than to the union. 
 
 
  219.  NLRB stands for the National Labour Relations Board. This is an 
administrative body in the U.S. that is responsibility of overseeing 
various facets of the collective bargaining relationship.  
 
10.  LRB stands for Labour Relations Board. Labour Relations Boards (or 
their equivalent) exist in all Canadian jurisdictions and are 
responsible for administering the collective bargaining relationship. 
 
11.  Cross-section micro data for a single jurisdiction also cannot control 
for provincial effects. This is the case for the Thomason (1992) and 
Riddell (1996) ULP studies but this is not the case for Martinello and 
Meng (1992). 
 
12.  This econometric approach assumes that the coefficients on the 
variables are constant across jurisdictions. An alternative estimation 
technique, Seemingly Unrelated Regression allows the coefficients to 
differ across jurisdictions. Concerns about sufficient degrees of 
freedom led to the choice of the first technique.  
 
13.  These diagnostic statistics are described in Tables 3 and 4 where they 
are presented with the estimation results. 
 
14.  For specific information concerning the sources of the data and 
descriptive statistics for all the variables used in the paper please see 
the data appendix. 
 
15.  Certification applications disposed is approximately equal to the 
certification applications filed in the period. 
 
16.  Another form of endogeneity also exists in this analysis. Chaison and 
Rose (1995) present empirical evidence that union density affects 
legislation. If legislation affects certification success and certification 
success affects union density and union density affects the degree of 
  22political success and political success affects legislation then the 
relationship is endogenous. This type of reverse causation is not 
likely to be important since the stock of union members affects 
political success and certification success is a flow that in any one 
period has a negligible effect on the stock. 
 
17.  In years when the legislation is introduced the variable is defined as 
the proportion of the year that the legislation is in effect. 
 
18.  Eleven industry groups are used. These are based on definitions from 
Labour Force, Statistics Canada and include: agriculture; forestry; 
fishing and trapping; mines quarries and oil wells; manufacturing; 
construction; transportation, communication and other utilities; trade; 
finances; service industries; and public administration. 
 
19.  New Brunswick is the omitted province dummy. New Brunswick is 
the only jurisdiction that over the period from 1978-1996 did not 
have any of the legislation discussed in this paper in force. 
 
20.  Other specifications were also estimated. These specifications 
included (national) year dummies, quadratic province-specific time 
trends and various forms of the environment variables (as described 
in the paper). The year dummies were usually not significant either 
individually or when tested as a group. This is also true for 
specifications that included the other forms of the environment 
variables. In any specification that included the legislation variables 
and the province dummies the coefficient on mandvote was always 
negative and significant. 
 
21.  All of the detailed information on British Columbia and Alberta 
comes from Martinello (1996a). 
 
 
  2322.  I would like to thank John Baldwin and Bob Gibson at Statistics 
Canada for kindly providing this data. 
 
23.  In fact data continued to be collected until 1996 but has not yet been 
made publically available. 
  24Table 1. Mandatory Representation Votes, Compulsory Dues Checkoff and First Agreement 
Arbitration in Canada 1976-1997* 
 
Jurisdiction Mandatory  Vote  Checkoff  First Agreement 
Federal   84:7  78:4 
Newfoundland  94:2 85:6 85:6 
PEI    not  yet  proclaimed** 
Nova Scotia  77:5    
New Brunswick     
Quebec   77:12  77:12 
Ontario  95:11 80:6  86:5 
Manitoba  97:2 72:11  82:2 
Saskatchewan   72:5  94:6 
Alberta  88:11    
British Columbia  84:6 to 93:1  77:9  73:11 
 
*The numbers in the cells of the table indicate the year:month the legislation is introduced.  In almost 
all jurisdictions the legislation remains in force until the end of 1996.  The one exception is 
mandatory vote legislation in B.C. that was repealed in January, 1993. 
 
**Legislation to introduce First Agreement Arbitration was passed in PEI on May 19, 1994.  It 
comes into force on proclamation.  It is not yet in force. 
 
Sources: 
Labour Legislation in Canada, 1949-50. Ottawa: Department of Supply and Services,  
 
Labour Legislation of the Past Decade: A Review of Developments in Canadian Labour Legislation 
for the 1951-1960 period. Ottawa:   Dept. Of Supply and Services, 1961. 
 
Department of Labour, Legislation Research Branch, Recent Legislation and Administrative 
Developments.  Ottawa: Department of Supply and Services,  1961, 1962, 1963, 1964, 1965, 1966. 
 
Labour Canada, Legislative Research Branch, Developments in the Enactment and Administration of 
Labour Law in Canada.  Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Services, 1966-67, 1967-68, 1968-69, 1969-
70, 1970-71. 
 
Labour Canada, Legislative Review.  Ottawa: Department of Supply and Services, volumes 1 
through 22, covering the period from 1973 to 1989-9. HRDC, Highlights of Major Developments in 




Table 2. Sample Variation in Legislative Environments 1978 to 1996 
 
 Legislative Environment  Number of Observations 
Mandvote Firstarb  Checkoff   
no no  no  38 
yes   no   no  28 
no yes  no  0 
no no  yes  26 
yes yes  no  0 
no yes  yes  65 
yes no  yes  0 
yes yes  yes  14 
Total 171 
 Table 3. Results - Certification Success Rate (certrate ) (1978-1996) 
 
Variables  #1 -OLS  #2 - OLS  #1 - FGLS  #2 - FGLS 
mandvote  -7.79 (1.84)**  -5.76 (2.15)**  -9.22 (.941)**  -8.79 (1.07)** 
checkoff    -.66 (3.12)  -1.82 (4.17)    -.40 (2.34)  -2.42 (2.36) 
firstarb      .87 (2.20)  -2.83 (2.85)    -.41 (1.44)  -3.16 (1.70) 
mix    3.51 (1.24)**   2.57 (1.64)   2.48 (0.78)**   1.06 (.841) 
female    -.04 (0.52)     .10 (0.86)   -.25 (0.26)   -.04 (.038) 
partime   1.38 (0.81)   0.76 (0.92)    1.00(0.40) *   .56 (0.51) 
density    .10 (0.33)   -.06 (0.46)   0.36 (0.19)   0.08 (0.25) 
uerate  -1.19 (0.35)**  -1.18 (0.45)**  -1.15 (0.14)**  -1.24 (0.21)** 
pdot     .33 (0.26)     .25 (0.29)     .10 (0.10)     .06 (0.16) 
bc   3.32 (4.33)   8.97 (8.70)   3.40 (2.70)   7.50 (4.78) 
alta  -3.48 (4.38)    -.46 (8.26)  -3.43 (2.99)  -5.51 (5.81) 
sask  30.41 (9.15)**  21.54 (15.95)  25.03 (5.71)**   8.83 (8.62) 
man  13.40 (5.10)**  10.16 (9.05)  12.34 (3.25)**   5.14 (5.82) 
ont     -.73 (3.66)  -4.21 (6.56)     .29 (2.62)  -6.08 (4.80) 
que  11.91 (3.62)**  13.41 (6.72)*  10.71 (2.69)**  12.36 (4.44)** 
ns  18.35 (3.01)**  13.96 (5.19)**  20.51 (1.66)**  16.44 (2.96)** 
nfld   7.86 (5.93)  4.86 (8.52)   5.37 (3.96)   5.37 (7.34) 
bctime      -.18 (0.48)      -.25 (0.26) 
altime      -.68 (0.46)      -.59 (0.33) 
satime       .47 (0.53)       .58 (0.31) 
matime       .45 (0.46)       .42 (0.32) 
ontime       .36 (0.45)       .32 (0.27) 
qutime       .12 (0.50)      -.06 (0.25) 
nbtime      -.14 (0.52)      -.31 (0.31) 
nstime       .06 (0.50)      -.07 (0.26) 
nftime       .43 (0.67)       .31 (0.40) 
constant  -52.78 (44.71)  -14.22 (63.82)  -13.95 (28.24)  40.62 (31.04) 
Diagnostic Statistics (FGLS specification was chosen 
based on a significance of at least 95%) 
  
Wald Statistic: Null hypothesis is that of homoscedastic 
errors across provinces. 
135.13** 130.39** 
Likelihood Ratio Statistic: Null hypothesis is that there 
is no correlation between the errors terms of the 
provinces at a point in time. 
75.53** 76.61** 
Autocorrelation Statistic: Null hypothesis is that there 
is common first-order autocorrelation across provinces. 
.1152 .1878 
Autocorrelation Statistic: Null hypothesis is that there 
is province-specific first-order autocorrelation .  (There 
are nine test statistics - only those that are significant at at 





The numbers in brackets are standard errors. **significant at at least the 99 per cent level *  significant at at least the 95 per cent level 
 Table 4: Results - Certification Proportion (certprop) 1978-1996 
 
Variable   #1 - OLS   #2 - OLS  #1 - FGLS  #2 - FGLS 
mandvote  -.087  (.020)**  -.144 (.023)**  -.054 (.020)**  -.14 (.018)**-. 
checkoff  -.013  (.040)  -.044 (.044)  -.017 (.024)  -.063 (.030)* 
firstarb   .055  (.030)   .017 (.030)  .029 (.015)  -.005 (.018) 
mix  -.007  (.020)  -.019 (.017)  -.018 (.009)*  -.014 (.011) 
female  -.028  (.007)**  -.031 (.009)**  -.022 (.004)**  -.021 (.005)** 
partime   .013  (.010)   .018 (.010)  .008 (.005)  .007(.006) 
density   .003  (.004)   .004 (.005)  .003 (.003)  -.002 (.003) 
uerate  -.009  (.005)**  -.015 (.005)**  -.016 (.003)**  -.017 (.003)** 
pdot   .012  (.003)**   .010 (.003)**  .006 (.002)**  .006 (.002)** 
bc   .128  (.060)*   .305 (.091)**  .136 (.060)*  .411 (.066)** 
alta   .003  (.060)  -.143 (.087)  -.070 (.044)  -.192 (.066)** 
sask  -.037  (.119)   .139 (.167)  -.113 (.073)  -.054 (..110) 
man  -.071  (.066)  -.085 (.095)  -.097 (.041)*  -.066 (.060) 
ont   .072  (.048)   .069 (.069)  .048 (.032)  .038 (.043) 
que   .272  (.047)**   .617 (.071)**  .276 (.068)**  .646 (.056)** 
ns  .202   (.039)**   .202 (.054)**  .164 (.036)**  .168 (.041) ** 
nfld  .161   (.077)*   .224 (.089)*  .215 (.052)**  .211 (.061.)** 
bctime    -.008 (.005)     -.012 (.003)** 
altime     .011 (.005)*    .011 (.004)** 
satime     .002 (.005)    .001 (.004) 
matime     .002 (..005)    .004 (.003) 
ontime     .004 (..005)    .005 (.003) 
qutime   -.022  (.005)**   -.021  (.004)** 
nbtime     .003 (.005)    -.0003 (.003) 
nstime   .006  (.005)   .005  (.004) 
nftime     .006 (.007)    .009 (.005)* 
constant  1.31  (.582)*  1.75 (.669)**  1.59 (.344)**  1.61 (.440)** 
Diagnostic Statistics:  FGLS specification was chosen based on   
significance of at least the 95% level.  
  
Wald Statistic: Null hypothesis is that there are homoscedastic errors across 
provinces. 
267.41** 150.03** 
Likelihood Ratio Statistic: Null hypothesis is that there is no correlation 
between the error terms of the provinces at a point in time. 
 59.23**   52.06* 
Autocorrelation Statistic:   Null hypothesis is that there is common first-
order autocorrelation across the provinces. 
2.59 .342 
Autocorrelation Statistic:   Null hypothesis is that there is at least one 
province with province-specific first-order autocorrelation. (There are 9 test 






The numbers in brackets are standard errors. 
**significant at at least the 99 per cent level 
*  significant at at least the 95 per cent level.  
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The data are annual and cover the period from 1978 to 1996. The data set 
begins in 1978 because data on the number of business enterprises by 
province are only available from 1978. Nine Canadian provinces are 
represented in the data. Prince Edward Island is omitted because no 
certification data are readily available for this province. (P.E.I. is a very 
small province with a total population of approximately 100,000.) 
Descriptive statistics for all of the variables used in the study are presented 




The certification success rate (certrate) is defined as the percentage of 
disposed certification applications that are granted. The data on 
certifications granted and certifications disposed come from Martinello 
(1996a). This publication provides information on all jurisdictions except 
P.E.I. Data are available from as early as 1951, for some jurisdictions, to 
1993 or 1994. Professor Martinello kindly provided updated figures until 
1996. The data are compiled from the Annual Reports of the private sector 
Labour Relations Boards (LRBs) of the various jurisdictions and include 
information on certifications in the public and private sector as well as the 
construction industry. Note that the data used for this paper do not allow us 
to distinguish between certifications granted to unions organizing new 
bargaining units and those grated to unions organizing existing bargaining 
units through raids or displacements. Such information is available only on 
a very limited basis in the Annual Reports. 
 
Special Notes on British Columbia and Alberta
21 
 
In 1988 legislation was passed in British Columbia that extended 
  8bargaining rights to teachers. The teachers responded by certifying the 
professional association that had functioned as their union. This change in 
coverage accounted for 75 certifications granted and disposed in 1988. 
Since this paper is not addressing the impact of changes in coverage on 
certification success the 1988 numbers for certifications filed, granted and 
disposed in B.C. in 1988 have been reduced by 75 to eliminate the impact 
on certification success of this legislative change. 
 
Data for certifications disposed and certifications granted in 1986 and 1987 
are not available in Alberta due to computer problems at the Labour 
Relations Board. These numbers are created using the same procedure as 
Martinello (1996a). Since the average ratio of certifications filed to 
certifications disposed is approximately one, certifications disposed is set 
equal to certifications filed for these two years. Certifications granted is 
obtained by multiplying certifications filed in 1986 and 1987 by the 
average of the ratio of certifications granted to certifications filed in 1989 
and 1990. This later period is used because a judicial ruling in 1984 that 
was later overturned meant that certification behaviour over the earlier 
period (1984, 1985) was highly unusual. Unfortunately it is not possible to 
adjust the data to eliminate the effect of the ruling. 1988 is not used because 
the computer problems meant that the data in 1988 only covers four months 
of the year. 
 
Certification proportion (certprop) is defined as the percentage of firms 
where certifications are granted. The data on number of firms are provided 
by the Business and Labour market Analysis Division, Statistics Canada 
from its Longitudinal Employment Analysis Program (LEAP).
22 The LEAP 
system is a longitudinal micro-database on businesses in the Canadian 
economy constructed through a record linkage of administrative data from 
Revenue Canada and Employment and Immigration Canada and Statistics 
Canada survey data. Only businesses that have paid employees in Canada 
are considered. The term business includes all businesses or organizations 
which during a reference year have remitted social security and tax 
  9deductions on behalf of these employees to Revenue Canada. 
Establishment data are only available from 1978. Almost all the LRB 
Annual Reports cover a 12 month period. However occasionally a LRB 
Report covers as short a period as 4 months or as long a period as 15 
months. This is not an issue in the construction of the certrate variable 
since both the numerator and denominator of this variable are defined for 
the same period of time. For certprop it is necessary to annualize 
certifications granted using the information on the length of time (in 
months) the Annual Report covers. This information is available in 




Mandatory representation votes (mandvote), compulsory dues checkoff 
(checkoff) and first agreement arbitration (firstarb) are captured using 
dummy variables. In each case the variable is equal to zero if the legislation 
is not in force in the period. It is equal to one when it is in force. It is equal 
to the fraction of the year that it is in force in the year it is introduced 
(months in force/12).  
 
The data for this variable are compiled from the sources listed in Table 1. 
Where possible the data are cross-checked against information available in 




The unemployment rate (uerate) for each province is the relevant series 
from the Labour Force Survey, Annual Averages database on CANSIM. 
(Series numbers: D987851, D987569, D987287, D987005, D986723, 
D986441, D986159, D985877, D985313).  
 
The inflation rate for each province (pdot) is calculated from the CPI- All 
Items for its largest city (1986=100). Again the source of this information is 
  10the CANSIM database (Series numbers: P818800, P818600, P818200, 
P817800, P817000, P816400, P816600, P816000) 
  11Employment and Industry Mix  
 
The industry mix variable (mix) is described in the paper. The base weights 
for the measure are the national unionization rates for each industry in 
1976. The Corporation and Labour Unions Returns Act (CALURA) 
provides unionization rates for eleven industry groups in 1976. The 
‘employment rate’ for each industry, in each year, for each province is 
calculated using data on employment that correspond to each of eleven 
industry groups of the unionization data and data on total employment in 
the province. This data, as well as the data necessary to construct the 
percent of employment that is part-time (partime) and the percent of 
employment that is female (female) are from the Labour Force Survey, 
Annual Averages and were accessed through the CANSIM database. 
(Series numbers: (total employment) D987714, D987342, D987150, 
D986868, D986586, D986304, D986022, D985740, D985176; 
(employment by industry) D987751-D987765, D987469-D987583, 
D987469-D987483, D987187-D987201, D986905-D986919, D986624-
D986637, D986341- D986355, D986059-D986073, D985777-D985791, 
D985213-D985227; (female employment) D987732, D987450, D987168, 
D986886, D986604, D986322, D986040, D985758, D985194; (part-time 
employment) D987797, D987515, D987233, D986951, D986669, 




The union density concept used in the empirical analysis is defined as: 
 
density = union members X 100 
              paid labour force 
 
 The series on union membership comes from the Corporation and Labour 
Unions Return Act (CALURA). This was discontinued in 1992
23. For the 
period from 1993 to 1996 a trend is fitted a trend to the existing density 
  12series and this is used to provide the data for 1993 to 1996. The CALURA 
series itself is not entirely consistent because of a revision in 1983. It also 
does not cover all union members because only unions with 100 or more 
members were required to report. Despite its limitations this is the best data 
available on union membership in Canada over this period.  
 
I have defined potential union members as the “paid labour force”. The 
paid labour force is equal to the total labour force minus those who are self-
employed. Again the data are from the LFS. Annual Averages on the 
CANSIM database.(Series numbers: (labour force) D987677, D987395, 
D987113, D986831, D986549, D986267, D985985, D985703, D985139; 
(self-employment) D987769, D987487, D987205, D986923, D986641, 
D986359, D986077, D985795, D985231)  
 
Table A1: Descriptive Statistics (1978-1996) 
 
Variable  Observations  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min   Max 
certrate 171  69.04  10.84  39.53  97.65 
certprop 171  .25  .15  .05  .79 
disprop 171  .36  .20  .08    1.08 
mandvote  171  .23  .42   0   1 
checkoff  171  .61  .49   0   1 
firstarb  171  .45  .49   0   1 
mix 171  28.74    2.38  22.34  33.20 
female 171  42.37    2.75  34.26  46.21 
partime  171  16.90   3.04   8.57  23.29 
density 171  31.26  4.97  21.20  45.40 
uerate  171  10.51   3.71   3.80  20.80 
pdot  171   5.02   3.19  -1.46  13.26 
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